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11 Introduction
Political economy has for long studied the effects of political representation (ide-
ologies and the identity of governing party) on the amount and composition of
public spending.1 This paper focuses, instead, on whether political representation
affects how public spending is done and, in particular, how public services are
procured.
Public procurement constitutes a large - 15% by OECD estimates (OECD,
2005) - and increasing part of economic activity. While there is a growing empiri-
cal literature on procurements and procurement auctions (e.g. Marion 2007,
Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti, 2007), the political aspects of procurement decisions
have to the best of our knowledge not been analyzed empirically before. We offer
such an analysis by asking how the political identity of the governing party affects
whether or not to procure a given service or good, and if, how to procure it. To
this end, we study the following four questions: Q1: Who procures? Q2: Condi-
tional on procuring, what types of auctions are organized and in particular, who
organizes open entry (as opposed to restricted, i.e. by-invitation-only, entry) auc-
tions? Q3: Conditional on organizing a restricted entry auction, how many and
what type of firms are invited and by whom? And finally, Q4: What determines
whose bid gets chosen?
Our aim is to contribute to the literature by studying public procurement
auctions of a clearly defined low-tech product, (internal) cleaning service con-
tracts, using data from Swedish municipalities in the 1990s. We have chosen
cleaning services because its very simple production process that should make it
1 See e.g. section 6 of Besley and Case (2003). Besley and Case report, for example, that Democ-
ratic governors in the US increase spending on state workers’ compensation programs by 2$ per
capita.
2amenable to being procured. The service is simple to contract on and, as we will
demonstrate, does not vary much in (unobserved) quality.2 For the same reason,
there should be relatively little reason to depart from standard auction formats,
and from the policy of granting the contract to the lowest bidder.
Sweden provides a good testing ground for us for two primary reasons.
First, it has been argued that despite a multiparty structure, there is a natural divi-
sion into right- and left-wing in Swedish politics that matters for policy outcomes
(e.g. Aronsson and Wikström 1996, Dahlberg and Johansson 2002, Pettersson-
Lidbom 2001, 2008, and Hanes 2007): Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds, for ex-
ample, that Swedish right-wing local governments accumulate more debt than
left-wing ones if they are certain to be replaced.3 It has also been documented that
the Swedish left-wing municipalities spend and tax 2-3 percent more than the
right-wing local governments and appear to care more about and be able to influ-
ence local unemployment (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008). The second reason why
Sweden provides a good testing ground for us is that the Swedish procurement
law of the time allowed the municipalities high degrees of freedom in organizing
procurements.4 Such  circumstances  seem to  have  been  rather  unique  and  do  not
exist e.g. within. the EU anymore, as the new EU directives on procurement proc-
esses are implemented across member states.
 While our mostly cross-sectional data dictates that we can fully address en-
dogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity only in studying the last (Q4) of our four
2 Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) compare auctions and negotiations in procurement and
stress the tradeoffs between hard-to-observe quality and price when objects are complex and con-
tractual design incomplete. In our case, exactly opposite holds: Objects are simple and contractual
design complete (at least when compared to the procurement of aircrafts and the like).
3 Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find that the central government distributes grants to areas where
there are many swing voters. They do not study the effect of the identity of the party in power on
this (presumable because there have been so few changes in central government in Sweden).
3questions, our analysis delivers some striking findings on the first three (Q1-Q3):
The propensity to procure cleaning services is not correlated with the political
identity of the governing party. Conditional on procuring, every municipality
grabbed the freedom allowed by the law, as no municipality committed to a stan-
dard (price) auction format of any kind. Nor did any municipality choose to have
an explicit scoring rule. We find that entry was restricted for 30% of the time and
that the political identity of the governing party is not correlated with organizing
an auction with restricted entry. Conditional on organizing an auction with re-
stricted entry, the number of firms invited to bid does not vary with the political
identity of the governing party either. There is however a difference in the identity
of the invited firms: Left-wing municipalities are more likely not to invite “in-
house firms”, i.e., the old cleaning departments of municipalities that have at
some point been transformed into a company and that still are owned by the mu-
nicipality.
Municipalities also grabbed the freedom allowed by the law to choose the
winner on the basis of “best economic value”, but left its contents completely un-
defined. Probably as a result of this, the lowest bidder does not win  58% of  the
time, and conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the municipalities end up
paying on average 43% more than the lowest bid. In the raw data, the probability
of the lowest bid not winning is 62.3% (49.8%) in municipalities with right-wing
(left-wing)  councils,  and  the  difference  is  significant  at  1% level.  This  result  on
the role of the governing party identity is confirmed when we apply the standard
random utility framework to study the bureaucrat behavior (pioneered by McFad-
den 1975, 1976): Our bid level analysis of which bid gets chosen shows that while
4 Public procurement continues to create controversy in Sweden even today: One of the leading
Swedish daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, has in 2007 had several articles on the functioning of
4all councils are price sensitive, the councils with left-wing majority are 1.5 times
as price sensitive as the right-wing councils. We find that holding the bids con-
stant,  municipalities  with  a  left-wing  majority  are  more  likely  to  choose  a  local
firm. We also find that variation in other municipal characteristics (unemployment
rate, population, and population density) have an effect on the choice of the win-
ner. In these estimations we control for unobserved heterogeneity, such as mu-
nicipal and object (e.g. the school which is to be cleaned) level unobservables. We
find no systematic evidence of bids being endogenous.5
These findings have implications for the literature on public spending and
provision of services. There is a long history of patronage in government contracts
with private firms, and market-oriented procurement is often advocated as a
means to block political concerns out of the process of providing public services.
Our findings cast doubt on this view. Our findings also have implications for the
economics literature on procurement auctions. We document that bureaucrat be-
havior and incentives matter in public procurement, especially in auctions in
which the non-price attributes of bid(der)s are allowed to be a determinant of the
award decision. We observe that the political identity of the governing party mat-
ters at micro-level, i.e., at the level of individual auction outcomes. This is not
consistent with what is typically assumed in the literature on procurement auc-
tions nor with parties preferring similar procurement (policy) outcomes in equilib-
rium (as predicted e.g. by strict convergence in the classical median voter mod-
els).
and alleged misconduct in public procurement.
5 While our object – procurement auctions – necessarily makes the well developed and large auc-
tion literature relevant for us, we consciously have chosen to study questions that allow us to not
take a stand on the issues at the heart of that literature: information of bidders, bidder types, and
bidder strategies. The reason for this is simple: The complete freedom allowed by the Swedish
procurement rules means that it seems impossible or at least extremely challenging to write down
5In the following section, we describe in detail the legal and institutional
environment, the product(s) (i.e., the objects of bidding) and the data. In section
three  we  present  our  reduced  form  results  on  the  first  three  questions  (Q1-Q3).
Section four is devoted to studying the fourth question (Q4) and, to this end, to
developing a random utility model of choosing the winner. We offer conclusions
in section five.
2 Institutional environment and data
2.1 Institutional environment and procurement law
Our data come from the period 1990-1998, and more than 90% of the data is from
the latter half of the period. During the latter half, public procurement in Sweden
was governed by the Public Procurement Act (LOU 1992:1528). While the law
was not yet in force in 1990-1993, the rules that applied then were essentially the
same as under the Public Procurement Act. This law specified the environment in
which the Swedish municipalities and bidding firms acted and was based on the
(then-prevailing) EU directives.
From the  point  of  view of  this  paper  the  following  features  of  the  law are
central: First, the municipalities were allowed to freely choose whether to procure
or to produce in-house.6 Conditional on deciding to procure, the law allowed them
to decide whether to allow open entry or not.  As for the mode of entry,  the law
a (structural) auction model that would capture the essence of the environment in which the Swed-
ish firms made participation and bidding decisions.
6 We take municipalities’ decisions about the number of cleaning service contracts that they pro-
cured, as well as their characteristics, as given. It is of course entirely possible that some munici-
palities decided to procure cleaning services for, say, some of their schools while keeping the
cleaning of others in-house. For a study of the behavior and market orientation of the municipali-
ties of a neighboring Scandinavian country (Denmark), see Christoffersen and Paldam (2003).
6allowed for four types of procurement mechanisms.7 The main difference between
these is that two (Simplified, Open) allowed free entry while two (Restricted, Ne-
gotiated8) did not. Conditional on restricting entry, the law allowed the munici-
palities to decide how many and which firms to invite.
Second, while the law allowed a municipality to arrange simultaneous pro-
curements (procurement auctions), combinatorial bidding was not applied (i.e.,
the procurement rules instructed firms to submit one bid per object and the mu-
nicipality should accordingly have made decisions “object-by-object”). Third,
only sealed bids were allowed. Fourth, the lowest bidder should have won. Fi-
nally, there was an exception to the “lowest bid wins” -rule: A municipality had
the freedom to deem that some other bid was “most advantageous economically”
when quality, environmental aspects, service and maintenance etc. were also
taken into account. The law did not force municipalities to use any explicit scor-
ing rules.9 Nor did it mention for example the locality of the bidder as an allow-
able dimension, but seems not to have ruled it out either. Under the current rules,
it is illegal.
It is illustrative of the atmosphere of the time that the freedom allowed by the
law to deviate from choosing the lowest bid was seen as beneficial. The following
quote from a book by a public sector lawyer testifies to this:
7 The law specified a threshold value of procurement (200 000€), below which Simplified and
Direct were allowed, and above which Open, Restricted or Negotiated were required. The question
if procurement mechanisms with restricted entry can be empirically motivated with high imple-
mentation costs is analyzed in Lundberg (2005). Using the same data as in the present paper
Lundberg finds no evidence of such relation.
8 While negotiations were allowed in Simplified and Negotiated procurements (see chapter 5,
“Procurement of services”, in the Public Procurement Act, LOU 1992:1528), they were not used in
the procurements that we study.
9 This has changed after our observation period, partly because of EU wide directives that dictate
that as a general rule, explicit scoring has to be used. However, it is important to keep in mind that
the  clear  purpose  of  the  Public  Procurement  Act  of  1992  was  that  if  the  lowest  bidder  is  not
awarded the contract, this has to be because along some well-specified (and ex ante notified) di-
mensions, some higher bid is “more economically advantageous”.
7“The tender having the lowest price offered should be accepted.  If it has
been stated in the advertisement that the most economically advantageous
tender will be accepted, factors specified therein can be taken into consid-
eration in the assessment of tenders. The factors can be stated according to
a degree of priority (LOU 1 ch. 22§), however this is not a requirement. On
the contrary, it can be advantageous to state in the advertisement that such
factors are non-prioritized, since this increases the possibility of being able
to choose the contractor.”  (Löfving 1994, pp. 65; our translation and
italics).
Besides the lax procurement law, an important aspect of the institutional
environment is that we study decision making by Swedish municipalities in which
a large fraction of the production of public services of the Swedish welfare state is
done. This means, first, that they operate within a homogenous and common po-
litical framework. Second, decision making is delegated: The principals are the
inhabitants of the municipality and the agent the municipal council (or more con-
cretely, the civil servants working under the council’s management, e.g., the per-
sonnel of municipal procurement units/offices). Third, the members of Swedish
councils are members of political parties and the political system can be character-
ized, at least to a first approximation, bipartisan (see, e.g., Pettersson-Lidbom
2008). Finally, the decision making in the Swedish councils is influenced by po-
litical bargaining and thinking, making the design and award decisions in public
procurement auctions subject to political ideology considerations.
Neither the prior political economy and science literature, nor the literature
on public procurement, gives clear-cut predictions on the effect of political repre-
sentation on procurement policies, except perhaps on the decision on whether or
not to procure in the first place. The available evidence from Sweden suggests that
when in control, the left-wing councils of Swedish municipalities employ system-
atically more government workers and are thereby able to influence local unem-
8ployment (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008). In our context, this political preference may
result in a reduced likelihood to procure.
It is less clear whether left-wing or right-wing municipalities prefer more
open entry or if entry is restricted, invites more bidders or particular types of bid-
ders.
2.2 Description of the data
Our bidding and procurement data come from a survey, administered to all Swed-
ish municipalities asking them for procurement documents regarding internal
cleaning services. The documents are contract notice, technical specification, list
of bidders, bids, and the decision protocol stating the winner of the contract. The
response rate was 79.5 percent. We don’t know if all the Swedish municipalities
that organized procurement auctions in cleaning services are in our data: 59 of the
229 municipalities that replied to the survey organized at least one procurement
auction in cleaning services during 1990-98. We have supplemented this data with
municipality characteristics, obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB).
A first look at the documents show that though the non-price criteria, if any,
should have been posted in advance, the weight attached to each criterion in the
evaluation was unknown to the bidders prior to the bidding.10 In other words, mu-
nicipalities did not use any explicit scoring rules during our observation period.
Our preliminary analysis of the procurement documentation shows that condi-
tional on procuring, every municipality grabbed the freedom allowed by the law,
as no municipality opted for and committed to a standard (price) auction format of
any kind. Nor did any municipality choose to have an explicit scoring rule.
10 An example of a typical contract notice is found in the Appendix.
9Table 1 describes how the procurements in our data are organized. Pro-
curement is an instance where a municipality purchases cleaning services for one
or more “objects” through a joint procurement procedure. The objects are the
premises to be cleaned and the bidders are Swedish firms. This feature of the data
means that the event of procurement can consist of one or more “auctions”. While
a separate, non-combinatorial auction is run for each object, there is an element of
sealed, pay-your-bid “multi-object auctions” to these procurements. As the col-
umn titled “All” shows the number of procurements in our data is 131 and the
total number objects is 758, of which 721 are included in our analysis.11 The num-
ber of objects per procurement varies from one (single-unit) to 74, and the number
of bids per object from one to 37. Some 50 objects obtain at most 3 bids, half the
objects 4-7 bids, and another 200 8-11 bids. We observe a total of 5926 bids. The
frequency at which the various procurement mechanisms were used is also re-
ported. Entry was open (i.e., classified either open or simplified in the table) in
70% of the procurements.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 also describes the municipalities who organize the procurements. We
have data (as of the date of the procurement) on the unemployment rate (unempm),
population (populm), population density (popdensm), average income (incomem),
share of inhabitants having a higher education (highedum) and a measure of politi-
cal ideology. Following earlier work with Swedish municipal level data (e.g.
Aronsson and Wikström 1996), our measure of political ideology is council com-
position. We define redm to be an indicator for the median voter of council m, i.e.,
it is equal to one if there is a left-wing majority (redpropm > 50%) and zero oth-
11 The remaining 37 contracts are excluded from the analysis, because there was one procurement
in which each contract had multiple winners (i.e., the contracts were “framework agreements”).
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erwise.12 This indicator captures the fact that party control changes discontinu-
ously at 50 percent of the vote share (Pettersson-Lidbom 2008) and is a parsimo-
nious way to capture the main division in Swedish politics.13 Left-wing majority
councils auctioned 454 objects, right-wing councils 267.
Table 2 describes the objects. The vast majority of them are schools or day-
care centers. The objects vary according to the characteristics we observe: size in
square meters (sizemi),  contract  length  (lengthmi), prolongation period (periodmi),
and required cleaning frequency (freqmi). The contract length is the stated contract
period and the prolongation period states the period that the contract can be ex-
tended with if the current holder of the contract has performed well after the con-
tract  period  has  expired.  The  prolongation  period  is  normally  one  or  two  years.
The cleaning frequency is the number of days during a year the object should be
cleaned.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The bidders in the procurements are Swedish cleaning service firms. There are
in total 322 firms in our data. They can be divided roughly into four categories.
First, there are 4 firms that operate nationally (“National”). This group includes
the largest, and some medium sized firms. For confidentiality reasons we have
labeled  these  national  firms  “Ns”, s = a, b, c, d. The largest national firms “Na”
and  “Nb”  submit  bids  for  most  objects,  whereas  “Nc”  and  “Nd”, two other na-
tional firms, submit bids for 6-10% of objects. Second, there are mid-size firms
that are active regionally (“Regional”). According to our classification, 70.5% of
12 Following earlier work, we categorize as leftwing council members those belonging to either the
Left Party or the Social Democratic Party, while members of the Conservative Party, the Center
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party are categorized as rightwing.
13 E.g. Aronsson, Lundberg and Wikström (2000, pp. 192) write: “These two variables [based on
council decomposition into leftwing (socialist) and rightwing (non-socialist)] are assumed to con-
trol for the widespread belief that socialists and non-socialists usually have different views about
public spending and that a fragmented parliament might find it hard to hold back public spending.”
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the firms are regional. The third group consists of small local firms that only bid
in one or a couple of municipalities (“Local”). The local firms constitute 27.5% of
the firms in the sample. The final group consists of firms that used to be the clean-
ing department of a municipality, but have at some point been transformed into a
company that still is owned by the municipality (“In-house production”). An in-
house municipal production unit participates in bidding for almost 40% of objects.
 [TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 describes the bidding level data for the estimation sample. It shows
that bids are on average 160 Swedish krona per sq.m. (circa 15€/sq.m.). Almost
three fifths of the bids (58%) were submitted in auctions with open entry (catego-
rized as open or simplified). The table also shows that most of our data (88%) is
from years (1994-1998) when the Public Procurement Act was in force. Regional
firms submit most of the bids (41%), followed by the few national firms (30%)
and local firms (21%). Inhouse firms submit 8% of the bids.
On average, there were 7.45 bidders in the auctions. For almost 58% of the
721 objects, the municipalities did not choose the lowest bid. Moreover, some
municipalities never award an object to the lowest bidder. Conditional on the low-
est bid not winning, the average difference between the winning and lowest bid is
42.9%.14 The raw correlation between the lowest bid not winning and the number
of entrants (bids) is 0.17 (significant at 5% level).15
14 Over all objects/auctions, the average difference between the winning and lowest bids is 24.7%.
15 The lowest bid won in 51% of open entry auctions, and only in 25% of auctions with restricted
entry. The correlation is entirely due to left-wing councils (correlation 0.30 and significant at 5%
level), as the correlation is only 0.06 (insignificant at 5% level) in right-wing councils. This indi-
cates that not choosing the lowest bid is positively correlated with the number of bids in the left-
wing municipalities.
12
3 Municipal decisions on procurement
organization
In this section, we focus on the first three questions of ours: Q1: Who procures?
Q2: Conditional on procuring, what types of auctions are organized and in par-
ticular,  who organizes  open  entry  auctions?  Q3:  Conditional  on  organizing  a  re-
stricted entry auction, how many and what type of firms get invited?
3.1 Q1: To procure or not?
A  first  decision  the  Swedish  policy-makers  had  to  make  was  whether  or  not  to
procure. The raw data reveals that only a minority of the municipalities used the
option: Only 26% (59/229) of the municipalities in the data organized at least one
procurement auction in cleaning services during 1990-98.
In Table 4 (Column 1), we report the results of a Logit regression in which
the dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one for those municipalities
that reported to have organized at least one procurement auction and is zero oth-
erwise. The explanatory variables are unempm, populm, popdensm, incomem,
highedum and redm, all measured at the start of our sample (as of 1990). There are
226 municipalities in the estimation sample.
The results show that the propensity to procure cleaning services is not cor-
related with the political identity of the governing party. This is not in line with
the view that left-wing municipalities are systematically against market-
orientation, nor with the available Swedish evidence which suggests that the left-
wing Swedish municipalities prefer larger public sector (Pettersson-Lidbom
2008). If one believes that this sort of political thinking characterizes Swedish
municipalities with left-wing councils, it is a bit surprising that the preference
does not result in a reduced likelihood to procure in our data.
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The results on the control variables show that larger and high income mu-
nicipalities are more likely to have organized a procurement auction. These results
are quite intuitive, as size and income are proxies for market size.
3.2 Q2: What type of auctions?
Conditional on organizing a procurement auction, the next decision the Swedish
policy-makers had to make was whether or not to allow for open entry. From the
raw data (Table 1) we know that entry was restricted in 30% of the cases.
In Table 4 (Column 2), we report the results of a Logit regression in which
the dependent variable is an indicator that is equal to one for those procurements
that had an open entry and is zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are un-
empm, populm, popdensm, incomem, highedum and redm, all measured at the time
the auction was organized, and a year dummy, taking the value of one for years
before 1994 and zero thereafter.16 There  are  130  procurements  in  the  estimation
sample.
The results show that the political identity of the governing party is not cor-
related with organizing an auction with restricted entry. There is some evidence
that high income municipalities restrict entry more often.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
16 We have also run a regression in which we control for the number and type of contracts, as well
as for the year when the procurements were organized. The qualitative results on the role of the
political identity of the governing party did not change. In these estimations, the number of objects
was negatively related with free entry (see also Lundberg, 2005).
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3.3 How many and which bidders to invite?
The raw data shows that in auctions with restricted entry, there are 7.8 (5.9) bid-
ders on average if the municipality has right-wing (left-wing) council. The differ-
ence is statistically significant (t-value 2.7). As for the identity of the invited bid-
ders, regional and national firms are nearly always invited: Their participation
rates are 99.0% and 98.4%, respectively. There is more variation in the participa-
tion rates of local and in-house firms in auctions with restricted entry.
The question of how many and what types of firms get invited to an auction
with a restricted entry is addressed in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. We report
separate results for a count (Poisson) regression in which the dependent variable is
the number of invited firms and for a bivariate Probit regression in which we ask
whether observable characteristics explain which types of firms are invited. The
bivariate Probit regression includes equations only for local and in-house firms (as
there is not enough variation in the participation rates of regional and national
firms). Besides the year dummy, the explanatory variables in these regressions are
unempm, populm, popdensm, incomem, higheducm and redm, all measured at the time
the auction was organized. There are 314 procurement auctions in the estimation
samples.
We find that conditional on organizing an auction with restricted entry, the
number of firms invited to bid does not vary with the political identity of the gov-
erning party.17 However, it has an effect on the identity of the invited firms: A
left-wing majority is more likely not to invite in-house firms. This suggests some
form of non-neutrality, as the political identity of the governing party affects the
way procurements are designed. Interestingly, the correlation of the residuals in
15
the bivariate Probit is negative. This suggests that holding municipal characteris-
tics constant, in-house firms are on average a substitute for local cleaning firms.
We also find that larger municipalities and municipalities with high population
density and unemployment rates are more likely invite in-house firms.
4 Modeling choice of winning bid
Raw data shows that in right-wing (left-wing) councils, the probability of the low-
est bid not winning is 62.3% (49.8%). The difference is significant at 1% level.
Conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the winning bid is on average 46.5%
(35.2%) higher than the lowest bid in the right-wing (left-wing) municipalities.
This difference is however insignificant. These numbers and tests suggest that
rightwing councils award the contract more often to a bidder other than the lowest
but conditional on doing so, they do not pay on average a larger premium over the
lowest bid.
To study the choice of the winning bid in greater detail, we adopt the ran-
dom utility model (McFadden 1974). We specify it to allow for the possibility that
the lowest bid does not win because the municipalities care for political reasons
about bid(der) attributes other than price.18
4.1 Econometric framework
To derive an econometric framework for our analysis, let the municipalities be
indexed by m, 1,...,m M= , objects to be cleaned by i, 1,..., mi I= , and bidders
17 We have also run a Poisson regression in which we control for the number and type of contracts
(objects). The qualitative results on the role of the political identity of the governing party did not
change.
18 An example is the locality of the firm, if the local politicians care about the firm’s profits. Other
such positive externalities include income taxes and employment (see Vagstad 1995).
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(firms) by j, 1,..., mij J= . The indirect utility of municipality m from choosing
bidder j to clean object i is:
1 2( )mij mi m mij mij mijU red bid qy h h e= - + ´ ´ + + , (1)
where miy  refers to the additively separable effects of munici-
pal/procurement/object characteristics, mijbid  to the bid (price) of firm j for object
i in municipality m (in 10 000 kronor per square meter), mijq  to ‘quality’, and mije
to an error term.
The municipal/procurement/object characteristics, miy , reflect the mean
utility that municipality m obtains when it has its premises cleaned and the object-
specific deviations from the mean. It thus captures all additively separable effects
of observable and unobservable municipal characteristics on municipal utility,
e.g., regional structure, demographics, income distribution, voter preferences, and
propensity to procure services. The term also refers to (un)observable object char-
acteristics, such as the type, size, location, etc. of the object. It captures differ-
ences in the indirect utility derived, e.g., from having a clean health center as
compared to having clean sports facilities. The assumed additive separability of
these  effects  and  the  distributional  (logit)  assumption  on  the  error  term (see  be-
low) allow us to condition all these effects out in the estimation.19
The second term in (1), 1 2( )m mijred bidh h+ ´ ´ ,  specifies  the  effect  of  a
submitted bid on the choice, with 1 2 mredh h+ ´  measuring the weight given to the
bid. The weight is a function of the political ideology of the local government,
allowing us to test whether the weight depends on the political ideology. One rea-
19 The term controls in addition for the additively separable effects on the utility of those charac-
teristics of the procurement event that do not vary over the bidding firms, such as whether or not
entry  to  the  auction  was  open and whether  or  not  the  object  was  auctioned as  a  part  of  a  multi-
object procurement.
17
son to test for this is that “bid preference programs” may explain the data. These
programs award a contract to the lowest preferred bidder, provided that its bid is
close enough to the lowest bid of the non-preferred bidders (e.g., McAfee and
McMillan 1989, Krasnokutskaya and Seim 2006, Marion 2007). These programs
give some firms preferential treatment, often because it is considered to be politi-
cally desirable.
The third term in (1), mijq , refers to quality and is included because munici-
palities may have resorted to a scoring auction, which balances the quality of the
bid(der) and price, or a to “beauty contest”, in which no scoring rule is announced
(Che 1993, Asker and Cantillon 2006).20 In principle, we could write the quality
term as 1 2mij mij mjq q qº + , where
1
mijq  allows for the possibility that municipalities
care about the quality of cleaning of a particular object for which firms are bid-
ding (i.e., ex ante object-level quality differences) and where 2mjq  captures the
possibility that there are firm-specific, as opposed to object-specific, quality dif-
ferences (i.e., ex ante corporate-level quality differences).
The extensive documentation available to us on the technical specifications
of  the  procurements  and  the  specifics  of  the  bids  however  suggest  strongly  that
1 0mijq º , i.e., that there are no ex ante quality differences at the object-level. That
is,  conditional  on  the  corporate  identity  of  the  bidders,  there  are  no  ex  ante  dis-
cernible quality differences between the bids for a specific object. The most com-
pelling support for this claim is provided by the technical specifications of the
procurement instructions. We obtained the procurement instructions of all the
objects (premises) in the data. These are in general very detailed - an example of a
20 Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) compare auctions and negotiations in procurement. They
stress the tradeoffs between hard-to-observe quality and price when objects are complex and con-
tractual design incomplete.
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typical technical specification can be found in the Appendix. Besides including a
detailed description of the premises to be cleaned, the frequency of cleaning,
cleaning method, cleaning substances that are preferred, and cleaning equipment
that is to be employed, they also go into much more minute detail.21 In addition,
the submitted bids reveal that firms almost without exception only detail i) the
object for which the firm is bidding, ii) the name and contact information of the
bidder, iii) and the price, despite the forms providing space for additional informa-
tion (see the Appendix for an example of a typical bid). If such information is
provided, it is invariably uninformative as to potential quality differences.22  Fur-
ther supporting evidence comes from interviews that we conducted and especially
the type of service we are studying.23
Even if there are no object-level differences in the quality of the bids, there
may have been corporate-specific quality differences (i.e., 2mjq ¹ 0). Indeed, the
21 For example, it is common to state requirements as to the professional education of cleaning
staff to be used. Similarly, the monitoring of cleaning is often specified in detail, and it is standard
to require the firm to inform the municipality on several features of the working process, to pro-
vide records of hours of work, workforce and machinery employed etc.. As if this wasn’t enough,
in several instances the procurement instructions go into great detail as to how each space (e.g.
classroom, toilet) is to be cleaned. All this suggests that it is very hard to differentiate one-self
quality-wise.
22 A typical piece of extra information is that the firm j plans to use certain substance S in cleaning,
say, school i. The procurement instructions however always dictate in detail the environmental
aspects of the substances to be used, and the extra information provided by firm j is that substance
S fulfills these criteria. This also suggests that the firms were not able to differentiate themselves
quality-wise in the bids.
23 We interviewed a (former) civil servant who used to be in charge of public procurement, and
three industry representatives. While the former civil servant maintained that local firms provide
higher quality through better local presence, he also mentioned a nationally operating firm as pro-
viding similar quality. The three firm representatives were unanimous in stating that all firms pro-
vide equal quality in public procurements. (One of them, a local operator, maintained that they
provide higher quality in private procurement.). They also mentioned that procurement instruc-
tions in public procurement are so well-defined that there is no room for (large) quality-
differences. Our final support for the claim of no quality differences at the object-level is based on
the type of service we are studying. The literature on the relative merit of negotiation versus auc-
tions (e.g. Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2003 and the literature cited therein) is - for good reasons
- mainly interested in “customized goods such as new buildings, fighter jets or consulting ser-
vices” (Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2003, pp. 1). We take a completely opposite track by study-
ing internal cleaning services. Our, admittedly layperson view of (good or bad) cleaning is that
“you cannot describe it, but you know it when you see it”. Cleaning is a labor-intensive, low-tech
service, the quality of which is easily monitored, for which the requisite skills are relatively easily
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only piece of information in the bids in which the firms were able to ‘differentiate
themselves’ (besides the price) is the corporate identity of the bidder. To capture
this, we let 2
1
K
mj jk mkk
q X a
=
º å , where the coefficients mka  are a function of mu-
nicipality characteristics 0 1
L
mk k kl mll
Za a a
=
º + å , where jkX  denote the kth ob-
servable characteristics of firm j (e.g., firm type, k = 1, …, K) and where mlZ  are
the lth observable characteristic of municipality m (e.g., council composition, un-
employment, l = 1, …, L). This specification allows jkX  and mlZ  to have a multi-
plicative effect on the indirect utility.24
The last term in (1), mije , is a stochastic error term that captures intrinsic
randomness in municipality decision making. It allows for idiosyncrasies deci-
sion-making that resulted every now and then in the lowest bidder not winning.
These idiosyncrasies may have been driven in part by lack of established pro-
curement practices and by the flexible legislative procurement framework of the
1990s. We assume that mije was unobservable to bidders and distributed i.i.d. type
I extreme value.
Given the above assumptions, the probability that bidder w wins in a pro-
curement auction for object i organized by municipality m is (McFadden 1974):
{ }
{ }
2
1 2
2
1 21
exp ( )
Pr[ ]
exp ( )mi
m miw mw
mi J
m mij mjj
red bid q
y w
red bid q
h h
h h
=
- + ´ ´ +
= =
- + ´ ´ +å
 (2)
acquired and are wide-spread, and cleaning services is an industry in which barriers to entry are
relatively low.
24 It is worth point out two things about this specification: First, the econometric model already
conditions on miy , i.e., on the (direct) effects of municipal/procurement/object characteristics on
the indirect utility. Second, when jkX  includes firm (type) dummies, 0k jkXa  captures fixed firm
(firm type) characteristics. These terms control for the effect on choice of permanent quality dif-
ferences between firms that are valued similarly by all municipalities. Together with the bids,
these terms thus allow controlling e.g. for the presence of a bid/price preference program in which
all municipalities run a similar, biased procurement auction that award contracts to the lowest
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where 2mjq = ( )01 1K Ljk k kl mlk lX Za a= =+å å .25 As specified, the model corresponds
to the standard conditional/mixed logit model and can be estimated by maximum
likelihood (ML). The ML estimation assumes that the bids are exogenous, and as
we report  below,  the  exogeneity  of  bids  can  be  tested  and  is  not  rejected  by  the
data.
4.2 Empirical results
Main results
Table 5 displays the estimation results: In column (1), the regressors include
mijbid  and m mijred bid´  only.  For  column  (2),  we  additionally  include  the  three
firm type -dummies. For column (3), we additionally include j mX Z´ , i.e., the
interactions between firm type -dummies and mred .  For  column (4)  we  add  the
interactions between the firm type -dummies and the remaining municipality
characteristics (unempm, populm, popdensm, incomem, highedum). In column (5),
we replicate the estimations of column (3), except that we add dummies for all
firms with at least 20 bids (the results are robust to using a lower cutoff; see the
robustness tests).26 These dummies allow for firm-specific deviations from the
firm-type dummies. Finally, in column (6), we replicate the estimations of column
(4), except that we add dummies for all firms with at least 20 bids. Each column
preferred bidders (say, to local firms), provided that their bids are close enough to the lowest bid
of the non-preferred bidder.
25 It is worth pointing out that things that do not vary within an auction drop out. One implication
of this is that the mixed logit should be relatively immune to sample selection bias. This would be
the case as long as the decision to procure the cleaning services, the choice of the entry mode, and
the choices related to the particular object are independent of the individual bidders/bids. As many
of those choices are made prior to firms submitting their bids, this seems a plausible assumption.
26 There are 322 firms in the sample, some of which only have a few bids.
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displays the results of Wald-tests for the null hypotheses that the sum of the coef-
ficients of the bid is zero and that the (added) control variables are jointly zero.
As the table shows, the bid coefficient is always negative and the weight put
on price varies with political ideology: Leftwing municipalities put much more
weight on the bids and the increase in the weight is always statistically significant.
This suggests, in particular, that while all councils are price sensitive, the councils
with left-wing majority are 1.5-2 times as price sensitive as the right-wing coun-
cils. This result is robust across the columns.
Both the control variables (excluding firm fixed effects) and the firm fixed
effects are jointly significant in each column. The data thus support the largest
specification, reported in column (6). From there we find that the coefficients of
redm*nationalj, redm*regionalj and redm*inhousej are all negative and jointly sig-
nificant (p-value = 0.017). Two of the three estimates are individually significant
at better than the 5% level. This means that holding constant the bids (and the way
the other observed municipal characteristics affect the award decision), munici-
palities with left-wing councils are more likely to choose a local firm.
We also find that variation in the characteristics of municipals has an effect
on  the  choice  of  the  winner:  Holding  the  bids  constant,  increases  in  unemploy-
ment co-vary positively with municipalities choosing regional, national and in-
house firms over local firms. An explanation for the last finding could be that in-
house firms may be pressured to use more labor than small local of firms, and that
larger regional and national firms are better able to commit to either increasing or
not decreasing their workforce.27 In more densely populated municipalities local
firms are preferred over national firms, whereas in larger (by population) munici-
27 In the interviews we conducted, the firm representatives claimed that all types of firms hire
mainly from the local labor market.
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palities, local firms are preferred over all other types of firms. It is however hard
to  explain  why these  municipality  attributes  have  an  effect  on  the  choice  of  the
winner.28
Taken together, these findings suggest that municipalities grabbed the free-
dom allowed by the law to choose the winner. They also suggest another form of
non-neutrality, as the political identity of the governing party affects the choice of
the winner. While we cannot be conclusive on why that is the case, it seems to be
important to understand better the effect of political incentives on public pro-
curement outcomes, especially in auctions in which the non-price attributes of
bid(der)s are allowed to be a determinant of the award decision.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
Endogeneity of bids
The estimations presented in Table 5 assume that the bids are exogenous, ruling
out  ‘favoritism’  that  would  affect  the  bids  of  the  firms  (i.e.,  favoritism  that  the
firms  are  aware  of  when  submitting  their  bids).  Favoritism  (or  even  corruption)
may however be present when the buyer has to delegate the organization of pro-
curement auctions to an agent.29 In Burguet and Che (2004), for example, the
lowest bid does not always win because the procurement agent may manipulate a
dimension of the submitted bid to favor a high bidder in exchange for a bribe (see
28 We are reluctant to give these results a causal interpretation. The reason is that we have not
modeled the firms’ bidding strategies, and therefore it is very likely that a change in the character-
istics of a municipality would lead to different bids.
29 Sweden is regularly rated as one of the least corrupt societies. Yet, Transparency International
(2006) states that “The Nordic countries dominate the top scores in the 2006 Corruption Percep-
tions  Index  for  the  European  Union  and  other  Western  European  countries.  But  they  have  no
grounds for complacency as scandals in recent years have shown that there is sadly no such thing
as a corruption-free zone.”
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also Laffont and Tirole 1991, Compte, Lambert and Verdier 2005, and Menezes
and Monteiro 2006). Because the Swedish procurement law allowed the munici-
pal procurement offices high degrees of freedom in choosing the winner, the pro-
curement offices may have found it relatively easy to manipulate a dimension of
the submitted bid (e.g., quality assessment) to favor a high bidder.30 This could
lead to endogenous bids, because a firm who knows that it will be favored can bid
higher and still expect to win.
To allow for favoritism and to test for the endogeneity of the bids, we aug-
ment the basic choice model with a favoritism term, mijf , to get
{ }
{ }
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1 2
2
1 21
exp ( )
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exp ( )mi
m miw mw miw
mi J
m mij mj miwj
red bid q f
y w
red bid q f
h h
h h
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. (2)
This specification immediately shows that favoritism does not lead to endogenous
bids if there is no heterogeneity in how prone bidders are to look for favors (i.e. if
mij mif fº ). The reason for this is that the econometric model conditions out such
additively separable effects. The same applies if there is no heterogeneity in the
vulnerability of the municipalities to favoritism (i.e. if mij jf fº ). The reason is
that the model we estimate conditions on the firm-type/fixed effects via term 2mjq .
The endogeneity of bids is thus a concern to us only if there are appropriate
‘matches’ in the data, i.e. if firms that look for a favor meet procurement officers
who are vulnerable to meet that demand.
30 Because the procurement officer could pick any bid, we can exclude ‘magic number favoritism’
wherein the corrupt procurement bureaucrat revises the bid of the favored bidder, or provides an
opportunity for this bidder to do so after all the other bids have been opened (see, e.g., Compte,
Lambert and Verdier 2005).
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Given  (2),  we  can  test  for 0mijf =  using the control function method of
Petrin and Train (2005, 2006).31 Applying their method to (2) requires that mu-
nicipalities’ ‘willingness to pay’ for a cleaning contract is increasing in the degree
of favoritism ( mijf ). This implies that firms who know that they will be favored
can  bid  higher  and  still  expect  to  win.  We  implement  the  test  as  a  Wald  test,
which  corresponds  to  a  generalized  method  of  moments  over-identification  test.
We recover a proxy, ˆ ˆmij mij mij mijf bid E bid Wé ù= - ë û , where mijW  includes all other
factors but mijf  that the firms take into account when submitting bids.
32 We esti-
mate the conditional expectation using cross-municipality variation in the bid data
and include the proxy, mˆijf , directly into the random utility specification.
33
The results of the Wald-tests for the null hypotheses of the exogeneity of the
bids are reported at the bottom of Table 5. While the p-values for Columns (1)-(4)
suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity for municipalities
with  a  left-wing  majority,  the  Wald-tests  show  that  once  firm  fixed  effects  are
allowed, the bids are not endogenous (see columns (5) and (6)). This finding is not
31 These papers consider characteristic-based discrete choice models of demand in a situation when
not all relevant product attributes are observed by the econometrician. In that set-up, the price of
the product can be correlated with the unobserved part of consumers’ utility. This is likely, if con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for product is increasing in the unobserved product attribute. The anal-
ogy of this to our approach is immediate.
32 Assuming that firms increase their bids when they expect to get a favor, the bids are monotoni-
cally increasing in mijf .  This implies that the bids are a function of the unobserved attribute and
that they are invertible in it.
33 To generate an instrument for the bid of firm j for object i in municipality m, we regress the bids
on municipality and object characteristics and firm dummies excluding all bids in municipality m.
We then predict how firm j would bid for object i in municipality m to obtain a Hausman-type
instrument for bid (price). By assumption, the instrument is independent of the vulnerability of
municipality m to favoritism. Using the entire sample of bids, we then recover the expect bid func-
tion by regressing the bids on municipality and object characteristics, firm dummies, and the in-
strument. Finally, we compute the proxy, include it in the utility specification (interacted with
mred ) and test whether the parameters on the proxy are significant. The 1st stage p-values for our
instruments are 0.07 in the bid equation.
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inconsistent  with  the  result  of  Bandiera,  Pratt  and  Valletti  (2007),  who find  that
most of the waste in their data on Italian procurement is “passive” (bad decisions)
rather than “active” (generating utility to the procurer).
Robustness tests
We have explored the robustness of our results in four ways. Taking each of them
in turn:
The first concern to address is that the multi-object nature of the data may
explain the observed behavior. In many instances, a municipality procured clean-
ing services for several premises simultaneously. To minimize immediate pro-
curement costs, the municipalities should have awarded each contract to the low-
est bidder. In a multi-object context such a procedure may however be a source of
inefficiency (e.g. Jehiel and Moldovanu 2003). The municipalities may thus have
taken an aggregate of the bids into account, even if the rules instructed the firms
to submit bids object-by-object and the municipalities to make decisions object-
by-object. To test whether the aggregate bid matter for the choice (there are no
combinatorial bids in the data), we include two new regressors to the choice
model: The first is mijavgbid , computed as the weighted average bid (10 000 kro-
nor/sq.m.) of firm j (weighted by object size) that it submitted for the objects that
were auctioned simultaneously with object i. The second is mijrat , defined as the
fraction of objects for which firm j submitted a bid (also measured using sq.m.) in
the procurement in which object i was auctioned. The underlying assumption is
that, after having conditioned out additively separable multi-object features that
are constant over firms within an object and a procurement, the weighted average
of the submitted bids is a proxy for the multi-object characteristic that the munici-
palities care about when making the award decision.
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The results (not reported) show that the inclusion of these two new regres-
sors does not change our main findings. For example, the coefficients of redm and
redm*bidmij are now -185 and -100, and the coefficients of the municipality char-
acteristic-firm type interactions are very close to those reported in Table 5. We
find some evidence that the municipalities have taken the aggregate of the bids
into account, as mijavgbid  obtains a negative (-5.001) and highly significant coef-
ficient (p-value < 0.01).
For our second robustness check we change the way the firm fixed effects
are controlled for in the basic estimation. Instead of including firm dummies for
all the bidders who have more than 20 bids in the sample, we estimate the model
(with exogenous bids) using 15 bids as the threshold.34 There are no major
changes in the qualitative results. The coefficients of redm and redm*bidmij are now
-198 and -161. While the latter point estimate is clearly smaller than that reported
in Column (6) of Table 5, it is within two standard errors (45) of the redm*bidmij
coefficient in Column (6). The statistical significance of the interaction terms be-
tween firm-type -dummies and municipal characteristics changes somewhat, with
all interactions with population now being insignificant. This is what we expect,
because the more there are firm fixed effects, the less precisely we can estimate
the firm type -dummies.
The third robustness check considers the effects of fly-by-night firms who
bid (very) low but are known to provide (very) poor quality, leading to munici-
palities not choosing the lowest bid. We test for the presence of such firms by
excluding from the sample all objects for which the difference (in percentage
terms) between the lowest and 2nd lowest bid is in the 95th percentile. Re-
34 There are 172 firms with less than 10 bids; of these, 92 have 1 bid, 32 2 bids, 10 3 bids, 13 4
bids, and 25 5-9 bids.
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estimating the conditional logit model(s) reproduces the results reported above in
Table 5 with minor quantitative changes: The coefficients of redm and redm*bidmij
are now -197 and -100 and within a standard deviation of our results in Column
(6) of Table 5.
Finally, for the fourth robustness check, we estimate a logit model in which
the dependent variable is whether or not the lowest bid wins and the explanatory
variables are the difference between the lowest and 2nd lowest bid, an interaction
of this difference with redm, and all five municipality characteristics. This estima-
tion echoes our earlier findings about the price sensitivity of political parties: The
larger the difference, the more likely that the lowest bid wins. The effect is not
significant for right-wing majority councils (coeff. 6.211, p-value 0.875) but is
highly significant in councils with a left-wing majority (coeff. 292.012, p-value
0.000).
5 Conclusions
Does political representation affect how public spending is done and how are pub-
lic services procured? To address these questions, we have studied the organiza-
tion of public procurement of cleaning service contracts in Swedish municipali-
ties. These services are simple to contract on and, as we have shown, do not vary
much in quality. There are few, if any, compelling reasons to depart from standard
auction formats and from the policy of granting the contract to the lowest bidder
in this environment.
Our data come from a period when the law allowed the municipalities high
degrees of freedom in designing and running procurements. This institutional en-
vironment left a lot of room for discretion and may thus explain the outcome we
observe in our data: Conditional on deciding to organize a procurement auction,
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no municipality  committed  to  a  standard  (price)  auction  format  of  any  kind,  nor
did they choose to have an explicit scoring rule. Municipalities also exploited the
freedom allowed by the law to invite bidders and choose the winner: A left-wing
majority is more likely not to invite “in-house firms”. The lowest bidder does not
win 58% of the time, and the weight put on price varies with political  ideology,
with left-wing councils being more price-sensitive. Conditional on the lowest bid
not winning, the municipalities end up paying on average 43% more than the low-
est bid. Holding the bids constant, left-wing majority councils are more likely to
let local firms win.
Taken together, our results suggest that politics both does and does not mat-
ter in procurement. The decision to procure or not, the choice of entry mode, and
the number of firms invited to bid are not subject to political influence in our data.
Given this, it is somewhat striking to find that politics matters at the very micro-
level: which firms to invite, how much weight to put on bids (relative to the non-
price attributes), and which type of firm’s bid to choose.
These findings have implications for the literature on public spending and
provision of services: While the propensity to procure cleaning services is not
correlated with the political identity of the governing party, the design and espe-
cially award policies are. This finding casts doubt on the notion that market-
oriented procurement is less subject to political concerns than public (internal)
provision. This is a cause of concern, not least because political involvement may
reduce the amount of cost savings that can be obtained from using procurement
auctions (see Christoffersen, Paldam and Wurtz 2007 for evidence on the costs
differences between public and private units in the cleaning of Danish schools).
Our findings also point to the importance of understanding better political
incentives and how they shape the design of and award decisions in public pro-
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curement auctions, especially in auctions in which the non-price attributes of
bid(der)s are allowed to be a determinant of the award decision. Why political
competition matters, how it affects procurement outcomes (e.g. firms’ bidding
strategies) and which kinds of public procurement are most affected by political
representation clearly warrant further analyses.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Allocation mechanism
Simplified Open Restricted Negotiated All
# procurements 60 32 24 15 131
# objects 129 315 255 59 758
Variable Statistic
# objects Mean 2.2 9.8 10.6 4.5 5.9
Stand. dev. 3.9 10.7 16.3 8.1 10.1
Maximum 27 37 74 29 74
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1
# bids Mean 7.1 8.9 7.4 5.5 7.8
on each Stand. dev. 3.9 4.3 3.3 2.5 3.9
object Maximum 37 25 16 22 37
Minimum 1 1 2 2 1
# bids Mean 6.1 8.1 7.8 6.3 6.9
in each Stand. dev. 4.6 5.4 4.0 4.9 4.8
procurement Maximum 37 25 16 22 37
Minimum 1 1 2 2 1
Contract Mean 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.7
period Stand. dev. 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7
Maximum 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Minimum 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.2
Prolongation Mean 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7
period Stand. dev. 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
Maximum 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Municipal characteristics (procurement level)
Red Mean 0.4 0.48 0.42 0.43 0.46
Stand. dev. 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.11
Maximum 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.67
Minimum 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.18
Density Mean 201.64 248.32 684.46 905.54 297.85
Stand. dev. 438.82 677.17 616.39 1252.11 611.00
Maximum 2808.02 13.96 2796.35 2749.69 2808.02
Minimum 4.60 4.58 60.54 24.20 4.60
Population Mean 70845.46 69600.58 61812.29 38548.64 65402.72
Stand. dev. 44.939.43 59363.74 19578.14 17305.05 44230.13
Maximum 188478 188478 118606 57427 188478
Minimum 10140 8710 26548 10795 8710
Unemployment Mean 7.92 8.53 7.24 7.32 7.89
Stand. dev. 2.12 2.02 1.98 1.99 2.23
Maximum 11.28 13.96 10.51 9.15 13.96
Minimum 1.94 4.58 3.95 1.76 1.76
Average income Mean 146.91 146.38 170.24 147.26 148.80
Stand. dev. 18.25 12.82 28.79 15.73 20.90
Maximum 197.00 177.50 217.80 189.4 217.80
Minimum 109.60 121.00 128.60 128.7 109.60
Higher education Mean 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08
Stand. dev. 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
Maximum 0.57 0.12 0.17 .016 0.57
Minimum 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
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Table 2.  Objects
Type Frequency Percent
Schools 319 42.1 757
Day care centers 302 39.9 757
Office 65 8.6 757
Medical health centers 27 3.6 757
Sport centers 16 2.1 757
Libraries 16 2.1 757
Others 12 1.6 757
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Table 3. Bid level descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Bid/sq.m. Swedish krona (SEK) 160.242 94.088 11 2174
Open 0.419 0.494 0 1
Restricted 0.411 0.492 0 1
Negotiated 0.061 0.240 0 1
Simplified 0.169 0.375 0 1
Local 0.209 0.406 0 1
Regional 0.408 0.492 0 1
Inhouse 0.080 0.272 0 1
National 0.304 0.460 0 1
t91 0.003 0.056 0 1
t92 0.055 0.228 0 1
t93 0.055 0.228 0 1
t94 0.143 0.350 0 1
t95 0.419 0.493 0 1
t96 0.254 0.435 0 1
t97 0.099 0.298 0 1
t98 0.020 0.139 0 1
NOTES: Sample is 5374 bids submitted for the 721 objects used in the estimation.
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Table 4. Regression results (Q1-Q3)
Red -0.407 -0.796 -0.115 -2.881 *** 1.089 *
(0.412) (0.567) (0.387) (0.667) (0.561)
Popdens / 100 0.025 -0.042 0.026 * 0.090 *** 0.110
(0.050) (0.037) (0.014) (0.030) (0.098)
Popul / 1000 0.031 *** 0.009 0.001 0.034 *** 0.022 **
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009)
Unemp -0.093 -0.149 -0.074 0.839 *** -0.080
(0.230) (0.137) (0.053) (0.163) (0.188)
Income 0.039 ** -0.063 *** 0.003 0.018 0.008
(0.017) (0.019) (0.007) (0.029) (0.030)
Highedu 0.110 3.522 -5.341 -76.237 *** 3.490
(0.663) (7.793) (7.114) (20.019) (10.940)
Time dummy (pre-1994) - -2.821 *** -0.310 0.397 2.080 ***
(0.833) (0.259) (0.789) (0.598)
Constant -6.233 *** 11.867 *** 2.313 * -5.308 -2.131
(1.940) (3.663) (1.206) (4.665) (5.565)
Rho
Log-likelihood -98.129 -59.599 -727.927
Number of obs. 226 130 314
LR-test: Rho = 0 (p-value)
"Procure or not?" "Entry mode?" "How many?"
Q3: Q3:
Variable
Q1: Q2:
(2)(1) (3)
In-house Local firms
(4)
"Who is invited?"
-111.376
314
<0.01
-0.98
NOTES: The numbers reported are the coefficients and standard errors. Method of estimation: Columns 1-2: Logit; Column 3:
Poisson with clustered standard errors; Column 4: Bivariate Probit. The sample consists in Column 1 of municipalities, in Col-
umn 2 of procurements, and in Columns 3-4 of auctions (objects) with restricted entry. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5 Results from conditional logit (Q4)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bid -165.05*** -155.105*** -155.226*** -150.022*** -203.287*** -202.832***
(14.969) (14.913) (14.939) (15.452) (19.845) (20.403)
Red*bid -130.542*** -160.007*** -158.807*** -159.394*** -96.609** -94.046**
(33.860) (35.594) (36.475) (36.918) (39.65) (40.023)
Regional -0.209 0.285 -9.418*** -0.728** -5.891
(0.157) (0.180) (3.037) (0.313) (3.703)
National 0.744*** 0.674*** -3.764 -0.646 -3.592
(0.152) (0.183) (3.257) (0.888) (4.001)
Inhouse 2.257*** 2.202*** 0.339 0.152 -0.412
(0.168) (0.201) (3.219) (0.801) (3.658)
Red*national 0.207 -1.119** -0.246 -1.610***
(0.334) (0.463) (0.380) (0.535)
Red*regional 2.587 -0.525 0.110 -0.844
(0.374) (0.506) (0.457) (0.596)
Red*inhouse 0.183 -0.814 -0.158 -1.405**
(0.369) (0.498) (0.412) (0.568)
Income*regional 0.037** 0.013
(0.014) (0.019)
Income*national 0.019 0.015
-0.017 (0.019)
Income*inhouse 0.001 -0.009
(0.017) (0.019)
Unemp*regional 0.512*** 0.567***
(0.160) (0.192)
Unemp*national 0.397*** 0.487***
(0.145) (0.174)
Unemp*inhouse 0.374** 0.449***
(0.148) (0.170)
Popdens*regional -0.002 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Popdens*national -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.0009)
Popdens*inhouse -0.002 -0.00004
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Popul*regional -2.81e-06 -0.00001**
(4.777e-06) (6.604e-06)
Pop*national -2.80e-06 -0.00001**
(4.00e-06) (5.865e-06)
Pop*inhouse -5.30e-06 -.00002**
(6.196e-06) (7.642e-06)
Highedu*regional 0.996 4.714
(6.248) (8.447)
Highedu*national -3.173 1.095
(5.021) (7.702)
Highedu*inhouse -4.120 -1.534
(13.308) (14.921)
Red+Red*bid 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Endog. Red 0.335 0.893 0.855 0.596 0.205 0.847
Endog. Red+Red*bid 0.002 0.039 0.014 0.038 0.164 0.290
Red*firm-type - - 0.170 0.068 0.763 0.017
Muni char * firm-type - - - 0.000 - 0.000
Controls - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm FE - - - - 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood -1203.095 -1061.0166 -1058.354 -995.944 -877.934 -838.824
Number of obs. 5372 5372 5372 5372 5372 5372
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NOTES: The numbers reported are the coefficients and standard errors. Red+Red*bid is the p-
value of a test of joint significance of the coefficients of the Bid and Red*bid variables. Endog.
Red (Red+Red*bid) is the p-value of a test of endogeneity of the Bid (Bid and Red*bid) vari-
able. Red*firm-type is the p-value of a Wald-test of the joint significance of the three council
composition dummy – firm-type- dummy interactions. Muni char * firm – type is the p-value of
a joint test of the joint significance of the other municipal characteristics  - firm – type dummy –
interactions. Controls is the p-value of a Wald-test of the joint significance of all control vari-
ables but firm fixed effects. Firm FE is the p-value of a Wald-test of the joint significance of the
firm fixed effects. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix. Procurement documents: contract notice, technical specification,
and bid.
Figure 1A. Example of typical contract notice.
“Quality monitoring: Documented quality
monitoring, with representatives from B
and E, should on the initiative from E take
place once a month.”
“Evaluation of tender/bid: Arvika Municipality will
accept the bid considered to be the most advantageous
economically with respect to price, quality,
competence, and seriousness. The evaluation criteria
are not ranked. Bids can be accepted without
negotiation.”
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Figure 2A. Extract from a typical technical specification.
Mop with moped
“Mop with moped. Mop with moped. Conditions:
Mop with moped in easy to access spaces such as
gymnasiums and broad and long hallways.
Estimated time includes manual mop in difficult to
access spaces.”
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Figure 3A. Extract from a typical technical specification.
Workroom:
M12 Dry mop, furnished space 8.5m2 Once a week
M13 Wet mop, furnished space 8.5m2 Once a week
M61Dust/wash furnishing and inventories 8,5 m2 Once a week
VX9 Empty waster-paper basket Five times a
week.
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Figure 4A. Example of typical bid.
Space for extra
information
Procuring
entity
The object for which firm j
is bidding
The bid in Swedish
kronor (SEK). Annual
price.
Identity of firm j and contact
information. The identity is
deleted due to that strict
confidence was assured when
the data was collected.
